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Background: A significant proportion of surgical patients are unintentionally harmed during their hospital stay.
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) aims to determine the aetiology of adverse incidents that lead to patient harm and
produce a series of recommendations, which would minimise the risk of recurrence of similar events, if
appropriately applied to clinical practice. A review of the quality of the adverse incident reporting system and the
RCA of serious adverse incidents at the Department of Surgery of Ninewells hospital, in Dundee, United Kingdom
was performed.
Methods: The Adverse Incident Management (AIM) database of the Department of Surgery of Ninewells Hospital
was retrospectively reviewed. Details of all serious (red, sentinel) incidents recorded between May 2004 and
December 2009, including the RCA reports and outcomes, where applicable, were reviewed. Additional related
information was gathered by interviewing the involved members of staff.
Results: The total number of reported surgical incidents was 3142, of which 81 (2.58%) cases had been reported as
red or sentinel. 19 of the 81 incidents (23.4%) had been inappropriately reported as red. In 31 reports (38.2%) vital
information with regards to the details of the adverse incidents had not been recorded. In 12 cases (14.8%) the
description of incidents was of poor quality. RCA was performed for 47 cases (58%) and only 12 cases (15%)
received recommendations aiming to improve clinical practice.
Conclusion: The results of our study demonstrate the need for improvement in the quality of incident reporting.
There are enormous benefits to be gained by this time and resource consuming process, however appropriate staff
training on the use of this system is a pre-requisite. Furthermore, sufficient support and resources are required for
the implementation of RCA recommendations in clinical practice.
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Patient harm is a well recognised fact; up to 10% of
patients acutely admitted to hospital are unintentionally
harmed [1-3], up to two thirds of which are surgical
patients [4]. It is therefore imperative that measures are
taken to minimise the risk of recurrence of adverse inci-
dents leading to unintentional harm. For this purpose, a* Correspondence: m.khorsandi@sms.ed.ac.uk
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reproduction in any medium, provided the ordetailed knowledge of the underlying causes of adverse
incidents is essential. Root Cause Analysis (RCA) is a
term used to describe a structured methodology for the
retrospective investigation of adverse incidents, near
misses and sentinel events [5,6], which was originally
developed to analyse major industrial incidents [5,7].
The quality and efficacy of this process relies on consist-
ent and meticulous incident reporting and analysis [1,8].
The concept of RCA was first introduced to the medical
community in the mid 1990’s [9] and since then it has
been playing an important role in improving patient careral Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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countries [5].
The aim of our study was to determine how efficient
the incident reporting process is in the Department of
Surgery of Ninewells Hospital, Dundee, one of Europe’s
largest teaching hospitals. We investigated the percent-
age of the recorded sentinel incidents that underwent
RCA, whether any recommendations resulted from this
process and what ratio of these recommendations were
implemented in clinical practice between May 2004 and
December 2009.
Methods
The Adverse Incident Management (AIM) database for
incident reporting and RCA was introduced in Ninewells
hospital in May 2004. Adverse incidents at this unit are
reported by staff members with the use of an online
template form, which is available on the hospital intra-
net. An ordinal score with a range from 1 to 5 and a cor-
responding colour is allocated to each incident by the
reporter, according to the severity of the incident as
determined by a reference table (Table 1). Sentinel or
Red incidents (score 4 or 5) include incidents that
have potentially caused serious physical harm and/or
deleterious financial effects, and thus gain priority inTable 1 The criteria used to determine the severity of inciden
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Deathreceiving an RCA. Adverse incidents are reviewed by
staff members from various backgrounds and different
levels of experience in performing RCA, i.e. surgeons,
managers and senior nursing staff. Sentinel incidents are
reviewed by a designated investigator and the outcome
is reported to the executive management. A meeting
with other members of the risk management team and
the involved staff members may be deemed necessary
during this process.
We retrospectively reviewed the recorded data for
each sentinel incident reported by the Department of
Surgery between May 2004 and December 2009. All ad-
verse incident reports involving colorectal, breast, vascu-
lar, upper gastrointestinal and hepatobiliary surgical
cases, as well as the ones from the Department of Ur-
ology and from the acute surgical admissions unit were
included in our study. Our primary endpoints were the
quality of the sentinel incident reports and the efficacy
of RCA recommendations. Patient confidentiality was
strictly protected at all stages of this study.
As a means to gain further information, we undertook
interviews of members of staff that were involved with
the reporting process and/or the reviewing procedure,
including clinicians, managers and nursing staff. During
the interviews, a brief description of the incident wasts
Consequences
harm People affected Schedule Reputation
us
injury

















































Khorsandi et al. Patient Safety in Surgery 2012, 6:21 Page 3 of 6
http://www.pssjournal.com/content/6/1/21provided as a reminder; the interviewees were then
asked to provide additional information on the incident
and the subsequent RCA, if one had been performed.
They were also asked to state whether the suggested
recommendations were, to their knowledge, implemen-
ted in clinical practice. The staff members beyond our
reach were contacted via email or telephone.
In order to minimise bias, we interviewed a separate
group of staff members that had not been involved in
reporting/reviewing the incidents, on each of the wards
that the sentinel incidents were reported from. The
aforementioned endpoints for each sentinel incident
were compared between the two groups of interviewees.
The time period between each event and the subsequent
interviews ranged from 2 months to 5 years.
Results
Between May 2004, when the Adverse Incident Manage-
ment (AIM) system was introduced in Ninewells Hos-
pital, and December 2009 a total of 3,142 surgical
incidents were reported. Eighty-one of the 3,142 inci-
dents (2.58%) were characterised as sentinel or red,
reaching an average of 1.2 sentinel incidents per month.
Certain groups of incidents occurred more frequently
(Figure 1). These included; 24 (29.6%) reports of staff
shortage leading to major compromise in patient care,
16 (19.7%) reports of methicillin resistant staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) sepsis or issues with the related policy, 7
(8.6%) reports of central venous catheters complications,
2 (2.4%) reports of patient falls leading to debilitating
morbidity and mortality and 2 (2.4%) reports of poor ad-
herence to the local cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR) protocol. Based on the criteria of Table 1, 19 of
the 81 incidents (23.4%) should not have been reported
as red. This fact may have resulted from reporter bias in
the selection of the incident severity score and perhaps
from lack of awareness of the aforementioned criteria.Figure 1 Most frequently reported surgical incidents.Deficiencies in the quality of the reports of sentinel
incidents were also revealed; in 31 reports (38.2%) vital
information was missing; in 12 cases (14.8%) the de-
scription of incidents was of poor quality and other
reports had information stored in the wrong field of the
template, rendering them incomprehensible or difficult
to follow. A direct correlation was identified between
the delay in reporting an incident and the deficiencies in
the incident report. During the interview stage of our
study, 43% of the interviewees who had been involved in
either reporting an incident or the consequent RCA,
were unable to recall the full details of respective inci-
dents or did not recall them at all. This signifies the im-
portance of prompt and concise reporting as soon as
possible after the incident has occurred. We consider in-
adequate training in incident classification and reporting
as an indisputable cause of the aforementioned deficien-
cies [10-12].
Of the 81 reported sentinel incidents 47 (58%) under-
went RCA and only 12 (14.8%) had any recommendations
implemented in clinical practice (Figures 2 & 3). Repeated
reports of similar incidents from the same source were
identified, indicating inefficiency of the RCA process in
particular cases. No substantial improvement was noted in
the quality of RCAs or implementation of recommenda-
tions over time within the study period, and although the
quality of RCA was variable amongst different surgical
wards, we did not identify any major differences. Consid-
ering that sentinel incidents are prioritised for RCA, one
could hypothesize that even fewer of the less serious ad-
verse events (i.e. green and amber incidents) underwent
RCA.
The efficacy of RCAs was variable depending on the na-
ture of the incident. Adverse events that were deemed
more likely to lead to patient harm, financial costs, or
negative publicity received a more vigorous investigation.
An example of an effective RCA with clinical implications
was a case of iatrogenic small bowel perforation during a
laparoscopic inguinal hernia repair (LIHR) performed by a
surgical trainee, which was not identified intra-operatively.
The patient subsequently required an urgent laparotomy
and small bowel resection and made an uneventful recov-
ery. In this case the RCA resulted in a substantial change
in the local practice of LIHR introducing a minimum of
one hundred supervised cases of LIHR before any trainee
could perform this procedure unsupervised and a system-
atic small bowel examination before closure was imple-
mented as a rule. However, many other reported sentinel
incidents did not result in similar changes.
In order to further assess the quality of the implemented
changes in clinical practice, we interviewed members of
the nursing staff. We attempted to reduce bias by recruit-
ing staff members that had not been involved in the inci-
dent reporting or RCA of incidents. We discovered that
Figure 2 Proportion of red incidents that received RCA and had recommendations implemented in clinical practice.
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mented changes, the overall impression was that in the
majority of the cases only one aspect of a problem was
being tackled instead of adopting broader improvements.
Discussion
The aim of hospital care is to provide appropriate
and safe service for patients. Nevertheless, up to
10% of acutely admitted patients are involved in ad-
verse incidents and can therefore be unintentionally
harmed [1-3]. Remarkably, up to two thirds of all
adverse incidents take place in surgery [4], more
than half of which may be preventable [4]. Preven-
tion efforts depend on the detailed knowledge of the
aetiologies of these events [13].
It is generally considered that errors are multifactorial
in nature and that they occur due to a failure of the sys-
tem rather than because of the failure of an individual in
performing their task per se [14]. RCA is a method for
retrospective analysis of systematically collected data
regarding incidents with an aim to determine the main
cause(s) of errors and to identify system or process
weaknesses that contributed to or allowed an adverse
event [9,15]. Reviewing adverse incidents with theFigure 3 Breakdown of the source of sentinel incident reports and thinvolved members of staff is thought to allow a better
understanding of the aetiologies of incidents by identify-
ing the so called “root cause” [8]. The purpose of RCA is
to answer three key questions: What was the adverse in-
cident? How did it occur? Why did it occur? [9,15,16].
Literature defines root cause as the element that, if
corrected, would prevent similar incidents from happen-
ing and assists in determining a management plan
should the same or a similar incident occur [5,9]. How-
ever, based on the fact that almost all adverse incidents
are multifaceted in nature, the terms root cause and
RCA seem to be misnomers [7,8,16]. In addition, RCA
as a term implies that the sole aim of investigation is to
discover what caused an adverse incident, whereas the
main principle behind this process is to reveal inadequa-
cies in the healthcare system and look at the broader
picture [16]. Nevertheless, it is readily used in the English
literature and we have not broken this tradition in our
report.
Considering the complex nature of the aetiologies of
adverse incidents, when an adverse incident occurs, it
would be inappropriate to place blame on individuals.
RCA is a method whereby focus is placed on mutual
learning and in-depth discussions regarding the incidente ratio of the subsequent RCAs.
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[7,12,17]. There is evidence that if performed correctly,
RCA is of great value in identifying root causes, facilitat-
ing incident management and error reduction, thereby
optimising patient care and safety in a healthcare system
[10,15]. It is therefore an extremely valuable tool in dis-
posal of modern healthcare.
Institutions perform RCA using either a “team-based”
or “investigator led” methods. There are certain merits
to the team-based approach compared to the investiga-
tor led method. In the latter method, an investigator
assembles the relevant information relating to the inci-
dent and reports to the management team so that the
relevant changes can be implemented. However, in many
centres it is now felt that a team of investigators with a
wide spectrum of skill and backgrounds e.g. risk man-
agers and clinicians should perform RCA in particular in
relation to the serious adverse incidents using a prede-
termined protocol. This would allow for a more effective
and thorough analysis of incidents [18], as supported by
our findings.
According to Reason’s model of human errors [14],
the team of investigators should take 3 important factors
into consideration for the investigation: Care manage-
ment problems (i.e. actions taken by members of staff
that is thought to have led to the occurrence of the inci-
dent), the clinical context of the incident and any factors
contributing to its occurrence [12,16]. A chronological
flow chart of the incident is then drawn, so as to tease
out where the system failed. The team then analyses the
incident, identifies possible aetiologies, and devises plans
to address any issues, aiming to ensure that a similar in-
cident will not occur. The incident reporter is then con-
tacted with a course of action. After the implementation
of the plan, feedback is provided to ensure the effective-
ness of recommendations [12,16] . RCA must be consid-
ered as an important duty, which would require
sufficient time and active input by the members of the
team [12].
Despite the benefits that RCA offers, certain limita-
tions exist. Although it aims to answer the 3 important
questions mentioned earlier, in many circumstances it
does not seem to reduce the risk of an adverse incident
recurring at a later date [15]. Therefore adverse inci-
dents frequently recur despite time and resource con-
suming RCAs [15]. It often suffers from hindsight bias;
adverse incidents are perceived to be more predictable
after they have taken place, whereas in reality this is usu-
ally not the case [9,19].
RCAs are time and resource consuming [15]. Many
incidents are multifactorial in nature and determining a
root cause is a great challenge [9,13]. Other reported
limitations of this system include: uncooperative collea-
gues, inter-professional differences, poor softwareperformance, lack of structured reporting and unsup-
portive management [10]. Furthermore, it is very diffi-
cult to follow-up the outcomes and recommendations
achieved from RCA. Experience has shown that recom-
mendations are not always adhered to in clinical practice
and incidents repeat themselves despite good quality
RCA and recommendations [15]. In support of this ar-
gument, our study revealed repeated similar reports
from the same sources. RCA should result in recom-
mendations, which need to be implemented in clinical
practice, in order to be cost-effective. For this purpose,
active support from the management is required and the
necessary resources need to be provided; otherwise the
likelihood of improvement is limited [12].
Reporting incidents can be challenging. Staff members
often have concerns about personally admitting a mis-
take and worry about penalty or litigation [1]. Moreover,
it is often difficult to categorise incidents according to
their severity, and they are often incorrectly, incom-
pletely and/or incoherently recorded on the database
[20]. In our study more than 50% of the reported inci-
dents were of inadequate quality. Certain centres have
provided Safety Improvement Programmes (SIP) for
training staff in incident reporting with a focus to im-
prove their RCA results. The SIP covers topics such as:
incident identification and prioritisation, systematic noti-
fication of incidents to the individuals concerned, inves-
tigation using the RCA approach, actions required
regarding recommendations, feedback of the collected
data to the system and appropriate discussion regarding
sentinel incidents. Evidence in the literature suggests
that SIP improves the quality of incident management
thereby leading to error reduction [10-12,21]. Reports
from U.K. hospitals, included exemplary practice of RCA
in only 2 of the 7 centres studied (29%), less rigorous
practice in 3 (43%) and scanty practice in the other 2
units [21]. The reports showed a definite correlation be-
tween training and the quality of RCA [21,22].
Our study demonstrates certain deficiencies of the
quality of incident reports, the ratio of sentinel incidents
that underwent RCA and the implementation of changes
in clinical practice. We discovered that a significant
number of incident reports were of poor quality, a fact
that can adversely affect the outcome of a subsequent
RCA. To improve the quality of incident reports, we rec-
ommend targeted formal training of staff members in in-
cident reporting. Sentinel incidents should be reported
shortly after their occurrence which, would in-turn allow
for an early RCA, and the potential recommendations
would hopefully prevent the recurrence of similar inci-
dents as early as it may be possible. Hospital manage-
ment should take a more active role in ensuring that any
recommendations are implemented in clinical practice.
The decision for an in-depth analysis of sentinel
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judgement of a designated reviewer. A predetermined
protocol for the analysis of sentinel incidents would cer-
tainly contribute to improved results. Furthermore, the
inconsistency of the incident report reviewers in terms
of training and experience in RCA may have led to dis-
crepancy in the quality of RCAs, and may have affected
the implementation of recommendations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, RCA is an important component of risk
management and clinical governance that aims to pre-
vent patient harm, with enormous potential benefits. It
does however rely on the good quality of adverse inci-
dent reporting. RCAs are cost-effective only if incidents
are thoroughly analysed in order for recommendations
to be made, and subsequently to be implemented in clin-
ical practice. Our study highlights the importance of
prompt and good quality incident reporting in facilitat-
ing the analysis of adverse incidents. A predetermined
protocol for the analysis of sentinel incidents by assigned
investigators would contribute to objective and more ef-
ficient RCAs.
We consider regular formal staff training and vigorous
reviews of this system necessary. Furthermore, sufficient
support and resources are required for the implementa-
tion of RCA recommendations in clinical practice.
Competing interests
There has been no competing interest with regards to this article.
Authors’ contributions
MK: Main author, data collector and interviewer. CS: Manuscript drafting, data
interpretation, critical analysis of the data. KB: Manuscript drafting, critical
analysis of the manuscript. AA: Project supervisor, critical analysis of the
manuscript. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Authors’ information
1. Maziar Khorsandi, MBChB, MRCS, BMSc, Senior House Officer, Department
of Cardiothoracic Surgery, Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, Edinburgh
2. Christos Skouras, MD, MRCS, Specialist Registrar, Department of Surgery,
Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, Edinburgh
3. Kevin Beatson, MBChB, Senior House Officer, Department of Orthopaedic
Surgery, Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, Edinburgh
4. Afshin Alijani, MBChB, FRCS, PhD, Consultant Surgeon - Chairman of the
Clinical Governance and Safety Committee, , Department of Surgery,
Ninewells hospital, Dundee
Acknowledgements
We acknowledge the valuable support of Mr. Philip Wilde and Mr. Paul Smith
who helped us with organising this study. We also would like to thank all
staff members of Ninewells hospital for their help.
Author details
1Department of Cardiothoracic Surgery, Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, 51
Little France Crescent, Old Dalkeith road, Edinburgh EH16 4SA, UK.
2Department of General Surgery, Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, 51 Little
France Crescent, Old Dalkeith road, Edinburgh EH16 4SA, UK. 3Department of
Orthopaedic Surgery, Royal Infirmary of Edinburgh, 51 Little France Crescent,
Old Dalkeith road, Edinburgh EH16 4SA, UK. 4Department of Surgery,
Ninewells Hospital, Dundee DD1 9SY, UK.Received: 8 June 2012 Accepted: 22 August 2012
Published: 29 August 2012
References
1. Braithwaite J, Westbrook M, Travaglia J: Attitudes toward the large-scale
implementation of an incident reporting system. Int J Qual Health Care
2008, 20(3):184–191.
2. Vincent C, Neale G, Woloshynowych M: Adverse events in British hospitals:
preliminary retrospective record review. BMJ 2001, 322(7285):517–519.
3. Thomas EJ, Studdert DM, Runciman WB, Webb RK, Sexton EJ, Wilson RM, et
al: A comparison of iatrogenic injury studies in Australia and the USA. I:
Context, methods, casemix, population, patient and hospital
characteristics. Int J Qual Health Care 2000, 12(5):371–378.
4. Gawande AA, Thomas EJ, Zinner MJ, Brennan TA: The incidence and
nature of surgical adverse events in Colorado and Utah in 1992.
Surgery 1999, 126(1):66–75.
5. Nicolini D, Waring J, Mengis J: Policy and practice in the use of root cause
analysis to investigate clinical adverse events: mind the gap. Soc Sci Med
2011, 73(2):217–225.
6. Shojania KG, Duncan BW, McDonald KM, Wachter RM, Markowitz AJ:
Making health care safer: a critical analysis of patient safety practices.
Evid Rep Technol Assess (Summ) 2001, 43:1–668. i-x.
7. Neal LA WD, Trevor H, Porter M, Hill D: Root cause analysis applied to the
investigation of serious untoward incidents in mental health services.
PsychiatricBulletin. 2004, 28:75–77.
8. Vincent CA: Analysis of clinical incidents: a window on the system not a
search for root causes. Qual Saf Health Care 2004, 13(4):242–243.
9. Choksi VR, Marn C, Piotrowski MM, Bell Y, Carlos R: Illustrating the root-
cause-analysis process: creation of a safety net with a semiautomated
process for the notification of critical findings in diagnostic imaging.
J Am Coll Radiol 2005, 2(9):768–776.
10. Braithwaite J, Westbrook MT, Mallock NA, Travaglia JF, Iedema RA:
Experiences of health professionals who conducted root cause analyses
after undergoing a safety improvement programme. Qual Saf Health Care
2006, 15(6):393–399.
11. Kingsbury N: VA patient safety program - A cultural perspective at four
medical facilities. The United States Government Accountability Office.
Report number: GAO-05-83, 2004.
12. Stecker MS: Root cause analysis. J Vasc Interv Radiol 2007, 18(1 Pt 1):5–8.
13. Rogers SO Jr, Gawande AA, Kwaan M, Puopolo AL, Yoon C, Brennan TA,
et al: Analysis of surgical errors in closed malpractice claims at 4 liability
insurers. Surgery 2006, 140(1):25–33.
14. Reason J: Human error: models and management. BMJ 2000,
320(7237):768–770.
15. Wu AW, Lipshutz AK, Pronovost PJ: Effectiveness and efficiency of root
cause analysis in medicine. JAMA 2008, 299(6):685–687.
16. Vincent C: Understanding and responding to adverse events.
N Engl J Med 2003, 348(11):1051–1056.
17. Williams PM: Techniques for root cause analysis. Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent).
2001, 14(2):154–157.
18. Taylor-Adams SVC: Systems analysis of clinical incidents: the London
protocol. Clin Risk. 2004, 10:211–220.
19. Reason J: Human Error. New York: Cambridge University Press; 1990.
20. Stanhope N, Crowley-Murphy M, Vincent C, O'Connor AM, Taylor-Adams SE:
An evaluation of adverse incident reporting. J Eval Clin Pract 1999, 5(1):5–12.
21. Wallace LM SP, Earll L: Evaluation of the NPSA's 3 day RCA Programme. Report
to the Department of Health Patient Safety Research Programme. Coventry:
Coverty University; 2006.
22. Wallace LM: From root causes to safer systems: international
comparisons of nationally sponsored healthcare staff training
programmes. Qual Saf Health Care 2006, 15(6):388–389.
doi:10.1186/1754-9493-6-21
Cite this article as: Khorsandi et al.: Quality review of an adverse
incident reporting system and root cause analysis of serious adverse
surgical incidents in a teaching hospital of Scotland. Patient Safety in
Surgery 2012 6:21.
